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 ABSTRACT 
This paper describes a method for devising transport strategies that makes iterative use of 
transport models to find the optimal levels of pre-defined transport measures.  It gives the 
results from using this method in nine European cities.  At the heart of the procedure lies the 
definition of objective functions which encapsulate policy-makers’ objectives with respect to 
economic efficiency and sustainability. These objective functions include a number of 
significant parameters  and the paper examines the sensitivity of the results to changes in the 
values of these parameters.   The parameters concerned are: the level of shadow price used 
with regard to public sector financial surplus and deficit; the trade-off between the 
perspectives of the present generation and a future generation (of importance to issues of 
sustainability); the trade-off between internal benefits/costs and external (environmental) 
benefits/costs; and the level of user benefits that can be “value captured” in the sense of 
raising additional finance for transport policies.  Full sets of results are given for these 
sensitivity tests, and a number of practical transport policy conclusions are made.  
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
A recent paper by May et al (2000) has described a procedure for finding optimal urban 
transport strategies and its application in nine “representative” European cities, as listed in 
Table 1.  The research was carried out within the project FATIMA ("Financial Assistance for 
Transport Integration in Metropolitan Areas") which was part of the European Union's Fourth 
Framework Research Programme.  The underlying aim of FATIMA was to devise and apply a 
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method for estimating optimal transport strategies within a context of limitations on public 
finance. 
 
The method for estimating optimal transport strategies consists of an optimisation procedure 
that makes iterative use of transport models to find the optimal levels of pre-defined transport 
measures.  At the heart of this procedure lies the definition of objective functions which 
encapsulate policy-makers’ objectives with respect to economic efficiency and sustainability 
(but not their objectives with respect to accessibility or intragenerational equity).  With 
respect to any one specific objective function, the optimal transport strategy is defined as the 
set of transport measures that maximises the value of the function.  A number of objective 
functions were defined in FATIMA, the main difference between alternative objective 
functions being the differing ways of treating public finance constraints. These objective 
functions include a number of significant parameters, and assumptions were made about the 
“best” values to attach to them in the optimisation process. Inevitably, questions arise as to 
how sensitive the final policy conclusions are to these parameter values. 
 
This paper examines the sensitivity of the results to a number of key parameters in the 
FATIMA objective functions, with two specific aims.  Firstly, an assessment is made of the 
robustness of the overall policy conclusions to changes in objective function parameter 
values.  Secondly, an examination is made of the appropriateness of the specific values 
chosen in FATIMA.   The parameters concerned are: (1) the level of shadow price used with 
regard to public sector financial surplus and deficit; (2) the trade-off between the perspectives 
of the present generation and of future generations (of importance to issues of sustainability); 
(3) the trade-off between internal benefits/costs and external (environmental) benefits/costs; 
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(4) the level of user benefits that can be “value captured” (from the private sector) in the sense 
of raising additional finance for transport policies. 
 
Section 2 gives an overview of the case study cities and transport measures considered in 
FATIMA, and the transport models used in them.  Section 3 gives definitions of the objective 
functions, whilst Section 4 summarises the results and recommendations from FATIMA, 
using default values of the above-mentioned parameter values.  Section 5 gives the results of 
the sensitivity tests, and Section 6 provides a number of transport policy conclusions.  
 
 
 
2 OVERVIEW OF CASE STUDY CITIES, TRANSPORT  
MEASURES AND TRANSPORT MODELS USED IN FATIMA 
2.1 Selection of case study cities 
As stated above, the nine case study cities were selected on the basis that they were "broadly 
representative" of European cities, although they are not necessarily representative in a formal 
statistical sense.  Table 1 lists the cities and their populations. 
 
 
Table 1 here 
 
2.2 Transport measures considered  
Table 2 shows the measures and their ranges used in the optimisation process.  Measures were 
defined relative to a do-minimum strategy which was already being planned by the city.  
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Thus, for example, the public transport infrastructure measures considered in the optimisation 
process were extra to the infrastructure measures already committed by the cities (but not yet 
built).  It should be noted that all the cities were planning local measures to: enhance 
pedestrian and cyclist mobility; reduce accidents; and increase traffic calming in residential 
areas.  These measures were assumed, in the optimisation process, to be fixed for all transport 
strategies considered. 
  
In most of the cities, where models permitted, a distinction was made between long stay and 
short stay parking charges, and between peak and off-peak values for frequencies, fares and 
road pricing charges.  
 
Table 2 here 
 
2.3 Transport models used  
The policy measures were tested using city-specific transportation models which had already 
been set up, calibrated and used by the city authorities before the start of the project. 
Differences in the models inevitably imposed a limitation on the study.  Ideally it would have 
been desirable to carry out a transferability analysis which applied more then one model in 
each city, thus identifying whether there was model-bias in the results.  However, such an 
analysis would have comprised a separate project in its own right.  The issue of model-bias is 
thus treated in this paper by a simple inspection of the model characteristics, along with 
speculation (at the time of reporting sensitivity test results in Section 5) as to which, if any, of 
these characteristics might have led to differences in the transport policy results. 
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Table 3 summarises the characteristics of the models. They fall into two main categories: 
strategic and tactical models.  The former are used for running simulations at a very high level 
of aggregation in terms of network representation, whilst tactical models are more detailed. 
Other important differences between the models (apart from the strategic/tactical distinction) 
lie in the treatment of behavioural responses.  Neither Italian model includes redistribution, 
generation or suppression, and the Austrian models also exclude generation and suppression.   
 
Table 3 here 
 
  
 
3 DEFINITION OF OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS 
3.1 Overview of objective functions 
All objective functions used in FATIMA were defined relative to a do-minimum strategy, 
representing a city’s committed transport plans over the next 30 years.  It follows that, by 
definition, the value of each objective function for the do-minimum strategy is zero.  Three 
primary objective functions were used in the optimisation process. The Benchmark Objective 
Function (BOF) represents economic efficiency and sustainability objectives, under an 
assumption of no fixed limit on public finance.  The Constrained Objective Function (COF) 
represents the same objectives as in BOF, but under the assumption that the availability of 
public finance (over a 30 year time horizon) is limited to that specified by the do-minimum 
strategy.  Thirdly, the Regulated Objective Function (ROF) represents the same objectives 
and assumptions as COF, except that there is the possibility of generating additional private 
finance through value capture. 
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All three objective functions are discussed in Minken (1999).  The strategies that find the 
maximum values of BOF, COF and ROF are referred to below as optimal BOF strategies, 
optimal COF strategies, and optimal ROF strategies respectively.  
 
In order to compute the above objective functions, five secondary objective functions are 
required: the Economic Efficiency Objective Function (EEFP); the Sustainability Objective 
Function (SOF); the Present Value of Finance (PVF); the (present value of net) Benefits (B); 
and the External Costs (EC).  All these objective functions are summarised in Table 4.  It can 
be seen that many of the objective functions are defined over a 30 year time horizon.  
However, only one future target year (typically 2015) was modelled in the FATIMA project, 
and it follows that the equations given below are more simplistic than if each future year (over 
a 30 year time horizon) were modelled separately.  
 
 
Table 4 here 
 
3.2 Present Value of Finance (PVF) 
The Present Value of Finance (PVF) of a set of measures is defined as the net financial benefit 
to government and other providers of transport facilities, both public and private, over a 30 
year time horizon, relative to the do-minimum. 
 
In the FATIMA study, where only one future target year was modelled, PVF was defined as: 
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where: I is the present value of the cost of public transport infrastructure investment, 
compared to the do-minimum scenario (it is assumed that all investment takes 
place immediately in year 0); 
f is the net financial benefit to transport suppliers in the modelled target year, 
compared to the do-minimum scenario, taking into account both revenue and 
operating costs; 
 r is the annual (country specific) discount rate. 
 
The value of r used in the FATIMA projects varied between 0.06 and 0.09, in line with the 
actual discount rates used in the countries whose cities were featured in the case studies.  
Whilst it was not feasible in FATIMA, it would be useful in further research to identify 
whether the differing discount rates had an effect on the selection of optimal strategy.  
 
3.3 The present value of net benefits (B) 
The present value of net benefits, B, consists of net benefits to travellers, operators and the 
government, over a 30 year time horizon but ignoring year 0 investment costs. 
 
The net benefits to travellers are evaluated as the generalised consumer surplus from the 
change in generalised costs on all travel movements, assuming that the demand functions are 
linear in the relevant region of generalised costs.  This is a standard evaluation procedure in 
cost benefit analyses of transport (see MVA et al, 1994). 
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The present value of net benefits, B, is given by: 
)2()()1(
130
1
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where: u is the net benefit to transport users in the target year, compared with the do-
minimum scenario; 
and  f, r are as defined above for Equation (1). 
 
 
3.4 External costs EC 
The external cost indicator for each mode is the change in veh-kms (compared to the do-
minimum) in the modelled year, factored by the sum of the accident, noise and pollution costs 
per veh-km, and summed over a 30 year period.  
 
Let Jam, Jnm and Jpm be the costs per vehicle kilometre for mode m due to accidents, noise and 
pollution respectively. Let km be the change in the vehicle kilometres by mode m in the target 
year (compared to the do-minimum strategy). The external cost indicator EC is defined as: 
 
EC km m
m
 ¦G J
      (3)
 
 where J J J Jm am nm p   m  
 and G   ¦
1
11
30
( )r ii
     (4)
 
 
Default J values were based upon costs given by Tinch (1995) as shown in Table 5.  
However, where alternative local values were available, they were used instead.  These local 
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values were broadly similar to the values given in Table 5, especially when aggregated over 
pollution, noise and accident impacts.  However, if the sensitivity results given in Section 5 
were to show that policy results are extremely sensitive to variations in J, the issue of "local 
values" versus "Tinch values" would need to be explored in more detail. 
 
Table 5 here 
3.5 Economic Efficiency Function (EEFP) 
The formula for EEFP is given by: 
 
  EEFP  =   B  -  I  +  O  PVF  - EC     (5) 
 
where:  B, I, PVF and EC are as defined above; 
1+O is the shadow price of public funds (the “standard” value given to O in 
FATIMA was 0.25).  
 
EEFP corresponds to a standard approach to cost benefit analysis. Minken (1998) indicates 
that 0.25 has been a standard value for O in a number of practical planning exercises, citing a 
review by Snow and Warren (1996) concerning the theory and estimates of shadow price for 
the use of public funds.  A cause for concern might be that, if O were to be set too high, 
“optimal” transport strategies would simply be those that generated large public sector 
revenues.  This issue will be examined further in Section 5. 
 
   
The Sensitivity of Optimal Transport Strategies to Specification of Objectives 
 
 
10
3.6 Sustainability Objective Function (SOF) 
The sustainability objective function (SOF) is given by: 
 
SOF = (1+O) f  +  u  -  y  +  hard penalty   (if fuel consumption exceeds 
        do-minimum) 
  (1+O) f  +  u  -  y   (otherwise) (6) 
 
where: y is a “soft penalty” on fuel consumption in the target year, calculated by 
multiplying the fuel consumption cost (relative to the do-minimum strategy) by 
a shadow price of 5; 
u, f and O are as defined above. 
 
The main intention of the soft and hard penalties on fuel consumption is to generate “optimal” 
transport policies that preserve natural resources.  The use of a hard penalty effectively 
ensures that such policies must use less fuel than those envisaged by the do-minimum 
transport strategy. 
 
A full report of the construction of SOF is given by Minken (1999), who describes how the 
approach is an adaptation of the work of Chichilnisky (1996) and Heal (1999) for the specific 
requirements of FATIMA.  Essentially, the SOF approach is to create a perspective that could 
be termed "dictatorship of the future", whereby the welfare of future generations totally 
outweighs the welfare of the current generation.  This perspective should be seen as in 
opposition to the "dictatorship of the present" perspective which, it is claimed, underlies the 
EEFP approach. 
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Ideally, SOF should reflect attributes of the transport system of relevance to future 
generations such as resource depletion, loss of life, degradation of the local environment, land 
consumption, ecological impacts and global warming.  Furthermore it would also assess these 
for a series of horizon years.  However, such an approach was not feasible in FATIMA due to 
limitations of the modelling tools.  Instead, a consciously simplified approach was adopted in 
which the major aspect of sustainability was assumed to be the renewability of fossil fuels as 
measured by the level of fuel consumption, and only one horizon year was modelled.  The 
level of fuel consumption was assumed to act as a proxy for all the other attributes of 
sustainability listed above.  Since fuel consumption is directly related to CO2 emissions, and 
closely correlated with atmospheric pollutants and accidents, such an assumption seemed to 
be reasonable for the purposes of FATIMA, although future research should allow for 
improvements to be made to the definition of SOF.  
 
 
3.7 Benchmark Objective Function (BOF) 
BOF (Benchmark Objective Function) is a combination of EEFP and SOF which balances the 
perspectives of current and future generations. 
 
It is defined as: 
 
BOF  = DEEFP  + (1 - D) SOF     (7) 
  
For the main tests in FATIMA, D was set at 0.1. Since SOF is only concerned with a single 
target year whilst EEFP is concerned with a (discounted) period of 30 years, it follows that 
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the size of EEFP will be approximately ten times the size of SOF.  Thus a value of 0.1 for D 
was chosen to ensure that the perspective of a future generation would have approximately the 
same weight as the perspective of the present generation. Since D was a new parameter 
created by the FATIMA project, no previous literature can be cited as to its “best” value. 
 
It would be interesting to examine how optimal transport strategies generated using BOF  
varied if the value of D were to be altered.  Since investment, such as on public transport 
infrastructure, is assumed to take place “immediately”, it is likely that the building of such 
infrastructure will appear beneficial to a future generation.  Thus the lower the size of D, the 
more likely it is that investment will be included in a BOF optimal strategy. 
  
The value of BOF is clearly affected by the non-inclusion of external costs in SOF, as 
discussed above.  However, a doubling of the size of J values would approximately 
compensate for this omission.  This observation leads directly to one of the sensitivity tests 
considered in Section 5.   
 
 
3.8 Constrained Objective Function (COF) 
COF (Constrained Objective Function) is an extension of BOF that takes into account that 
there is a fixed constraint on public money.  For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that 
public finance is constrained to the level implied in the do-minimum scenario. 
 
COF   =  BOF  if  PVF > 0      (8) 
  =  BOF  + hard penalty if PVF < 0 
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3.9 Regulated Objective Function (ROF) 
ROF (Regulated Objective Function) is an extension of COF, and recognises that extra 
(private) finance can be input to the transport system through value capture (VC).  VC is 
defined as a proportion E of user benefits, which are seen as a measure of overall 
accessibility.  The logic here is that companies in the city should (collectively) be prepared to 
pay for overall city-wide accessibility improvement due to the benefits that they gain from 
this in terms of efficiency of commuter trips and business trips, inward investment (due to city 
attractiveness) and general city regeneration.  
 
ROF = BOF    if PVF  + VC > 0   (9) 
  = BOF + hard penalty  if  PVF + VC < 0 
 
where:  
 
VC =  E  G u  if u > 0    (10) 
  =  0     otherwise 
and where G is as defined above. 
 
For the main tests in FATIMA, E was set at 0.1.  However, since no evidence was found in 
the literature on the percentage of benefits that can be captured, it was considered important to 
carry out sensitivity tests on E. 
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4 RESULTS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS USING 
STANDARD PARAMETER VALUES 
4.1 Optimal transport packages using standard parameter values 
Table 6 summarises the optimal strategies for the Benchmark Objective Function (BOF), the 
Constrained Objective Function (COF) and the Regulated Objective Function (ROF) for the 
nine cities. Furthermore it gives the PVF and PVF per capita of these strategies.  It can be 
seen that in six of the cities (Edinburgh, Vienna, Eisenstadt, Oslo, Torino and Salerno) the 
BOF optimal strategy had a positive PVF so that the revenues generated by the strategies 
were more than sufficient to cover costs.  Therefore, there is no need to calculate a separate 
(constrained public finance) COF optimal strategy for these cities.  Furthermore, since value 
capture is only considered when optimal strategies lead to public finance deficits, there is no 
need to calculate separate ROF optimal strategies for them. 
 
For the three remaining cities (Merseyside, Tromsø and Helsinki) distinct COF optimal 
strategies needed to be calculated.  Of these, only the strategy for Merseyside generated 
sufficient positive user benefit to make the use of value capture a viable option (given the 
definition of VC in Equation (10) as being a proportion of user benefits).  Hence Merseyside 
was the only city for which there was a separate ROF optimal strategy. 
 
In terms of the optimal strategies produced, Table 6 shows that the BOF optimal policy is 
most likely to involve: (1) at most limited public transport infrastructure investment on top of 
what is already planned; (2) low cost increases in road capacity; (3) improvements in public 
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transport by increasing frequency and/or reducing fares; and (4) restrictions on car use 
involving either road pricing or increased parking charges. 
 
Table 6 here 
 
Inspection of the results in Table 6 leads to the definition of four classes of city: 
 
Class 1.  Cities which fulfil two criteria.  Firstly, the BOF optimal strategies have large 
negative PVFs resulting from being supportive of both car and public transport users 
(so that the city must provide finance).  Secondly, there is a significant possibility for 
value capture to support optimal policies under a regime of hard constraints on public 
finance. Merseyside is the only Class 1 city out of the nine case study cities. Its BOF 
optimal strategy has a PVF of -1472 euros per capita. 
 
Class 2.  Cities where BOF optimal strategies are supportive of both car and public transport 
users (and hence have large negative PVFs as in Class 1 cities), but where there is no 
significant possibility for value capture to support optimal policies under a regime of 
hard constraints on public finance. Helsinki and Tromsø are both Class 2 cities and 
their BOF optimal strategies have PVFs per capita of -1955 and -1474 euros 
respectively. 
 
Class 3.  Cities where BOF optimal strategies place financial restrictions on cars but are 
supportive of public transport users, so that the former are subsidising the latter.  In 
this case, the city makes a surplus, but this surplus would not be expected to be large.  
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Edinburgh, Eisenstadt, Torino and Salerno are Class 3 cities and their BOF optimal 
strategies have PVFs per capita of 555, 900, 490 and 591 euros respectively. 
 
Class 4.  Cities where BOF optimal strategies place restrictions on both cars and motorised 
public transport, and the city raises revenues from both user-types through road user 
charges (parking and/or road pricing) and increased public transport fares (with no 
significant increase in frequency).   In this case, the city makes a surplus which is 
large. Vienna and Oslo are Class 4 cities and have PVFs per capita of 2534 and 6503 
euros respectively. 
 
There is no immediately obvious correlation between the class of a city and its characterstics 
in terms of population, geographical location or other features.  However, further research 
could explore more formally whether such a correlation exists, considering also 
characteristics such as: city density; level of income and employment; and the state of the 
transport system in the do-minimum, including mode shares and transport costs. 
 
A significant question arises though as to whether the allocation of cities to classes is 
dependent upon the parameters used in the objective functions.  It is important therefore to 
carry out sensitivity tests as to whether or not this is the case, and this will be done in Section 
5.  Since size of PVF is subsumed within the definition of class, the sensitivity analysis will 
not consider PVF further in a comprehensive manner (except for the analysis of E), although 
it will be mentioned sporadically where appropriate. 
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5 SENSITIVITY TESTS 
5.1 Overview of sensitivity tests 
FATIMA project resources did not allow for all sensitivity tests to be carried out in all case 
study cities.  However, as Table 7 shows, a selection of sensitivity tests were carried out in 
eight of the case study cities. 
 
Table 7 here 
 
 
 
5.2 The shadow price 1+O 
The “standard” shadow price on public money (1+O) was set at 1.25 for the results given in 
Section 4.  As was seen, Edinburgh, Oslo, Vienna and Salerno were all either Class 3 or Class 
4 cities whose BOF optimal strategies produced finance surpluses (as represented by positive 
PVFs).  It could be argued that the use of a shadow price led directly to such strategies, and 
that they would not have been produced had there been no shadow price. The sensitivity test 
used in these four cities was to lower the shadow price to 1.0 (i.e. set O = 0) and investigate 
whether non-revenue generating strategies become optimum. On the other hand, Merseyside 
was a Class 1 city and produced a highly negative PVF for its optimum BOF strategy.  The 
sensitivity test in this case was to increase O by steps up to 1.5 to understand at what point, if 
any,  a BOF optimal strategy would be produced that was not expensive for the city.  The 
BOF optimal strategies resulting from all these sensitivity tests are shown in Table 8.  
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Table 8 here 
  
It can be seen from Table 8 that the reduction of O from 0.25 to 0 had little or no effect on the 
BOF optimal strategies in Edinburgh and Oslo.  However, such a reduction led to significant 
changes in Vienna and Salerno.  In Vienna, an increase in fares of 77% was altered to a 
decrease of 15%, whilst in Salerno an increase in fares of 25% was altered to a decrease of 
50%.  The reduction in O changes Vienna from being a Class 4 City to a Class 3 City so that 
although the revised BOF optimal policy generates a net revenue, this revenue is severely 
decreased.  The reduction in O changes Salerno from a Class 3 city to a Class 2 city, so that 
BOF-optimal strategy needs to be financed by the city. 
 
For values of O under 1.0, there was little change in the BOF optimal strategies for 
Merseyside.  However, increasing O to 1.0 and 1.5 led to: a reduction in increases in peak 
frequency;  smaller fare reductions (70% rather than 100%);  and the imposition of a road 
pricing charge of 1 euro.  The revised BOF optimal strategy for higher O changes Merseyside 
from a Class 1 City to a Class 3 City. 
 
Comments on model effects 
 
Section 2.2 described how the Vienna and Salerno case studies used models which do not take 
into account generation and suppression effects (as shown in Table 3), whilst the Edinburgh 
and Oslo models do represent such responses. Since the decrease in O from 0.25 to 0 leads to 
a substantial decrease in traveller finance costs in the optimal strategies for Vienna and 
Salerno, but not in Edinburgh or Oslo, it could be suggested that the differences between the 
two city pairs are accounted for by the models. 
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 It is reasonable to assume that in reality the reduction in traveller finance costs, in whatever 
mode, will lead to an increase in the total level of transport demand.  Thus a model which 
assumes a fixed level of transport demand is liable to underestimate the revenue produced 
when traveller finance costs are decreased, and to overestimate revenue when such costs are 
increased.  It follows that the "revenue generating emphasis" of the optimal policies when O is 
set at 0.25 in Vienna and Salerno might be a result of the lack of representation of suppression 
and generation in their models. However, such a conclusion is not proven and requires further 
research. 
 
5.3 D in BOF 
Sensitivity tests for six city case studies were performed on the weight D between EEFP and 
SOF in BOF, as defined in Equation 7.  As stated in Section 3.7, the standard value of D=0.1 
was based upon the concept of equal weighting between the perspective of the current 
generation and the perspective of a future generation.  A greater emphasis is put upon the 
perspective of a future generation if D is decreased, and upon the current generation if D is 
increased. The range of tests was from D=0.0 (corresponding to no emphasis on the 
perspective on the current generation) to D=1.0 (corresponding to all emphasis on the 
perspective of the current generation, as in a traditional cost benefit analysis).  The optimal 
strategies resulting from tests with variations in the value of D are given in Table 9. 
 
Table 9 here 
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In general, the optimal BOF strategies were relatively insensitive to changes in D. In fact, 
increases in D from 0.1 to 0.25 led to virtually no changes in optimal strategy in any city.  The 
increase to 1.0 led to a change in optimal strategy only in Oslo, where the already high 
revenue-generating optimal strategy became even more extreme. Probably the most important 
result for increases in D was that the medium public transport infrastructure options in 
Edinburgh, Merseyside and Oslo were robust to such increases.  Hence, they were still part of 
optimal strategies even when the full costs of construction were taken into account in the 
objective function (as is the case when D equals 1.0). 
 
In Edinburgh and Vienna, decreases in D (to 0.015 and 0 respectively) led to a high level of 
public transport infrastructure being introduced.  On the other hand, in the Salerno and 
Merseyside case studies, no extra infrastructure was introduced when D was set at 0.  Since 
the Eisenstadt and Oslo case studies did not permit high levels of infrastructure being 
introduced, they do not throw light on this issue.  Other results from lowering D were that 
road pricing increased in Edinburgh, public transport frequency increased in Vienna, fares 
were reduced in Oslo and free long stay parking was abolished in Merseyside. 
 
The general lack of evidence of sensitivity to higher D suggests that strategies which reflect 
the present generation's perspective also generally reflect a perspective with equal emphasis 
on the present and future generations.  In other words, optimal strategies under a pure 
economic efficiency objective are liable to be the same as under a balanced economic 
efficiency / sustainability objective. 
 
The setting of D to 0 is likely to lead to a higher level of extra infrastructure being introduced 
(on top of the do-minimum level), but this cannot be guaranteed in all cases.  This result is not 
The Sensitivity of Optimal Transport Strategies to Specification of Objectives 
 
 
21
surprising since the construction costs of extra (present day) infrastructure are not met by 
future generations.  However, this conclusion should be qualified by a recognition that setting 
D to zero, and thus ignoring current infrastructure costs, is almost certainly unrealistic in 
practical policy-making. 
 
5.4 The external cost parameters J 
The J parameters feature in the definition of external costs (EC), as given in Equation 3, and 
are concerned with the effects of strategies on the local environment and safety.  As described 
above, EC is used in the definition of EEFP (Equation 5) but not in the definition of SOF 
(Equation 6).  The case studies of Edinburgh and Merseyside tested increases in  J  whilst the 
Merseyside, Vienna, and Eisenstadt case studies tested decreases.  The optimal BOF strategies 
resulting from changing the value of J are given in Table 10. 
 
Table 10 here 
 
 
It can be seen from Table 10 that if J values take the order of magnitude given in Table 5, 
they have little effect on the overall optimal BOF strategies, in the sense that there is virtually 
no difference in the specification of optimal strategies if external costs are ignored (with J 
being set at 0).  A doubling of the value of J had no effect in Merseyside but led to a doubling 
of road pricing charges in Edinburgh.  A ten-fold increase in J in Merseyside led to an 
imposition of an all-day road pricing charge of 3.5 euros and changed the city from Class 1 to 
Class 3. 
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These results can be interpreted in two alternative ways.  Firstly, it can be argued that the 
values used for J are based upon the best estimates of costs of externalities that are available.  
It is clear that these costs would have to be increased several-fold to change the optimal 
strategies.  It follows immediately that the strategies which are optimal without considering 
externalities under a balanced economic efficiency / sustainability objective are the same as 
those that are optimal if externalities are considered.  However, on the other hand, if one is 
suspicious of the process of valuing externalities and thinks that J values should be higher, it 
can be noted that in some cases they need to be higher by more than a factor of two in order to 
affect the nature of the optimal strategies.   
 
 
5.5 E for value capture 
The raising of finance through value capture was considered, in FATIMA, to be mainly 
concerned within scenarios in which optimal BOF transport strategies led to a public sector 
financial deficit.  If it were assumed that hard constraints on public spending were imposed, 
then such strategies would be unaffordable without some extra financial input from the private 
sector.  Value capture is potentially a mechanism for providing such finance.  Ideally, the use 
of value capture would make it (financially) feasible to implement optimal transport strategies 
whilst still remaining within strict public sector spending limits. 
 
As the classification of cities (in Section 4) has shown, there was a public sector deficit with 
regard to BOF optimal strategies in only three of the nine city case studies: Merseyside, 
Tromsø and Helsinki.  In these cities, the optimal COF strategies (assuming hard constraints 
on public spending with no value capture) were significantly different from the optimal BOF 
The Sensitivity of Optimal Transport Strategies to Specification of Objectives 
 
 
23
strategies, as shown in Table 6.  In such cities, ROF optimal strategies were found in which 
extra finance was available from value capture. 
 
E was defined as being the proportion of user benefits that could be “captured” (from the 
private sector) to help create optimal transport strategies: the standard value given to E was 
0.1. At this level, it was found that only Merseyside would benefit significantly from value 
capture, in the sense that the optimal ROF strategy was significantly different from the 
optimal COF strategy.  Hence Merseyside was defined as a Class 1 city whilst Tromsø and 
Helsinki were defined as Class 2 cities (as reported in Section 4).  
 
The standard value of 0.1 given to E was somewhat arbitrary, since there is little experience of 
using value capture on a strategic level (as opposed to using it for one spatially-specific 
infrastructure project).  It could be argued that a value of 0.1 was somewhat pessimistic.  Thus 
it was considered necessary to carry out an analysis on this value to determine the level of E, 
if any, at which optimal BOF strategies would be financially feasible, even under strict public 
spending limits, using value capture. 
 
Table 11 shows the user benefits (UB) and values of PVF for the BOF optimal strategies of 
Merseyside, Tromsø and Helsinki.  Furthermore, it shows the level that E must be in order to 
raise a sufficient amount of value capture for funding the optimal BOF strategy under a 
constrained public finance regime.  This level is calculated simply by dividing PVF by UB. 
 
Table 11 here 
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For Helsinki the required value of E is 0.76 so that 76% of user benefits would need to be 
recaptured through value capture.  Such a figure might be considered unattainable.  On the 
other hand, the comparable figures for Merseyside and Tromsø were 0.37 are 0.30 
respectively.  Further research is required to examine whether this level of value capture is 
feasible.  
 
Merseyside is a Class 1 city whatever the value of E.  However, with sufficiently high values 
of E for Tromsø and Helsinki, they move from being Class 2 cities to Class 1 cities.  
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 6 TRANSPORT POLICY CONCLUSIONS 
In many cases the optimal strategy is sensitive to decisions on the use of a shadow price for 
public funds, and the level at which this should be set.  A shadow price indicates that there are 
opportunity costs involved in the use of public funds for transport.  Where an increase in 
public expenditure on transport is justified with a shadow price, this suggests that it is 
justifiable either to increase taxation to pay for improved transport, or to reduce expenditure 
in competing policy areas.  Where an increase in revenue is justified with a shadow price, this 
suggests that it is appropriate to reduce public expenditure on transport, by increasing the cost 
to the user or reducing the service offered.  This can result either in reduced taxation or 
increased expenditure in competing policy areas.  It is clear from the results given in Section 5 
that it is important to test the sensitivity of strategies to the use, and level, of a shadow price.  
Where strategies are sensitive, the policy implications require careful assessment. 
 
The optimal strategies given in Section 4 were relatively insensitive to the balance between 
the perspectives of current and future generations, except when this balance was strongly in 
favour of future generations.  Thus the strategies which reflect the present generation's 
perspective are also likely to reflect an equal balance of perspectives between current and 
future generations.  When the perspective of future generations becomes paramount, strategies 
are likely to change in favour of increased car user costs and reduced public transport fares.  
High investment in further public transport infrastructure (on top of what has already been 
committed) appears to be optimal only when such a perspective is paramount. 
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The optimal strategies are relatively insensitive to the costs of externalities.  When externality 
costs are based upon currently accepted values, optimal strategies are similar to those with no 
value assigned to the externalities.  This implies that those strategies which are most effective 
in achieving a balanced economic efficiency / sustainability objective also perform best when 
this objective is extended to take into account the local environment and safety, using 
standard values for the costs of these.  However, if greater emphasis were to be put on the 
local environment and safety by evaluating their costs at a much higher level, optimal 
strategies would be likely to involve imposing higher charges for car use. 
 
When hard constraints on public funds are applied and the revenue for optimal strategies 
cannot be met by user charges (as was the case in three of the case study cities), a potentially 
attractive option lies in raising extra finance through value capture.  With regard to the three 
case studies concerned, it was found that a minimum of 30% of net user benefits would need 
to be captured.  If this level were achievable, value capture would provide an important 
mechanism for injecting extra finance into the transport sector. 
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City Country Population (k)   
Eisenstadt Austria 10   
Tromsø Norway 57   
Salerno Italy 149   
Edinburgh (MA) UK 420   
Helsinki (MA) Finland 910   
Oslo (MA) Norway 919   
Merseyside (MA) UK 1440   
Torino (MA) Italy 1450   
Vienna Austria 1540   
MA : metropolitan area 
Table 1 : The FATIMA case study cities 
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 Policy measure Range 
Name Aggregation Min 
Value 
Max 
Value 
High public transport 
infrastructure investment  
n/a 0 1  
(dummy) 
Medium public transport 
infrastructure investment  
n/a 0 1 
(dummy) 
Increase/decrease of road 
capacity 
whole city  -20% +10% 
Increase/decrease in public 
transport frequency 
whole city; all-day, peak, 
off-peak 
-50% 
(-30% for Torino) 
+100% 
(+30% for Torino) 
Road pricing to enter city 
centre 
city centre; all-day, peak, 
off-peak 
0 5.0 euros 
Increase/decrease in 
parking charges 
city centre; long & short 
term, long term, short term 
-100% +300% 
(+100% for Torino) 
Increase/decrease in public 
transport fares 
whole city; all-day, peak, 
off-peak 
-100% 
(-50% for Helsinki) 
+100% 
Table 2: Measures tested in FATIMA, their aggregation and ranges 
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 Edinburgh Merseyside Vienna and 
Eisenstadt 
Oslo Tromsø Helsinki Salerno Torino 
Model START START VW  RETRO and 
EMME/2 
EMME/2 based PKS model and 
EMME/2  
T.Model 
T.Road,T.Bus 
T.Model and 
MAESTRO 
Strategic/ 
tactical 
Strategic Strategic Strategic Tactical Tactical Tactical Tactical Tactical 
Responses Mode, 
Route, 
Time of day, 
Distribution, 
Generation/ 
Suppression 
Mode, 
Route, 
Time of day, 
Distribution, 
Generation/ 
Suppression 
Combined 
distribution and 
mode choice, 
Route, 
Pedestrian delay 
Mode, 
Route, 
Time of day, 
Distribution, 
Generation/ 
Suppression 
Mode, 
Route, 
Time of day, 
Distribution, 
Generation/ 
Suppression 
Combined 
distribution and 
mode choice, 
Route 
 
 
Mode, 
Route 
 
Mode, 
Route 
 
Periods AM peak 
PM peak 
Rest of day 
AM peak 
PM peak 
Rest of day 
All day AM peak 
Rest of day 
AM peak 
PM peak 
Rest of day 
AM peak 
PM peak 
Rest of day 
Peak period Peak period 
 
Table 3: Model characteristics 
Objective 
function 
Acronym Description 
Present Value of 
Finance  
PVF Present value of net financial benefits to operators and government, 
calculated over a 30 year time horizon. 
(Present value of 
net) Benefits 
B Present value of net benefits to travellers, operators and the government, 
calculated over a 30 year time horizon but ignoring initial infrastructure 
costs. 
External Costs EC Present value of costs of pollution, noise and safety calculated over a 30 
year time horizon. 
Economic 
Efficiency 
Function  
EEFP Present value of net benefits to travellers, operators and government, 
combined with external costs, calculated over a 30 year time horizon.  
There is a shadow price on government revenues and costs, determined by 
the parameter O. 
Sustainability 
Objective Function 
 
SOF SOF focuses entirely upon the net benefits of travellers, operators and 
government in a future target year.  It imposes a high shadow price on 
fuel and dictates that the fuel consumption of the do-minimum strategy is 
the maximum allowable.  
Benchmark 
Objective Function   
BOF BOF trades off economic efficiency (EEFP) and sustainability (SOF).  
The relative weights accorded to EEFP and SOF are determined by the 
parameter D.   
Constrained 
Objective Function 
COF Extension of BOF which assumes that public finance is constrained to the 
do-minimum level. 
Regulated 
Objective Function 
ROF Extension of COF, which recognises that extra (private) finance can be 
input to the transport system through value capture.  The level of value 
capture is determined by the parameter E. 
 
Table 4: Summary of the FATIMA objective functions 
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  Pollution Noise Accidents Total cost 
Car 0.0275 0.0373 0.0222 0.087 
Bus 0.2176 0.0746 0.0453 0.3375 
Tramway 0.0 0.0622 0.0453 0.1075 
Total 0.2451 0.1741 0.1128 0.532 
Table 5: Pollution, noise and accident costs in euros per veh-km (J values) given by Tinch 
(1995) 
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Measures 
 
 
Cities 
Objective 
function 
PT 
Infrastructure 
investment - 
High, Medium 
or None 
Increasing/ 
Decreasing 
Road 
capacity 
 
PT frequency 
† 
PT fares † Road 
Pricing 
† 
Parking 
Charges @
PVF  
(Meuros) 
PVF / 
Popn 
(Euros 
per 
capita) 
Edinburgh BOF, COF, ROF  Medium 10% 85%(70%) -90%(-35%) 
 
1.6(1.6) ~(300%) 233 555 
          
Merseyside BOF Medium 10% 50%(-40%) -100%(-100%) 0(0) -100%(100%) -2120 -1472 
Merseyside COF Medium 10% 20%(-50%) -65%(-40%) 1(1) 0%(200%) 32 22 
Merseyside ROF Medium 10% 20%(-50%) -75%(-40%) 1(1) 0%(100%) -152 -106 
          
Vienna BOF, COF, ROF None -10% 0% 77% 0 0%(245%) 3903 2534 
          
Eisenstadt BOF, COF, ROF - -15% -50% -50% 0 -50%(115%) 9 900 
          
Tromsø BOF - 10% 46%(0%) -100%(-50%) 2(1.6) -100% -84 -1474 
Tromsø COF, ROF - 5% 25%(15%) -50%(+40%) 2(3) -100% 9 158 
          
Oslo BOF, COF, ROF Medium 10% -15%(0%) -5%(-15%) 5(5) 0% 5976 6503 
          
Helsinki BOF No 0 25%(13%) -12%(-50%) 0(0) 0%(0%) -1779 -1955 
Helsinki COF, ROF No 0% 0%(-10%) -5%(-15%) 0(0) 20%(90%) 52 57 
          
Torino BOF, COF, ROF No 10% 30% 100% 0 100% 710 490 
          
Salerno BOF, COF, ROF No 0 80% 25% 0 300% 88 591 
- not included 
~  indicates irrelevant around the optimum 
† off peak values are shown in ( ) for Edinburgh, Merseyside, Tromso, Oslo, Helsinki 
@
 long stay; short stay values are shown in ( ) for Edinburgh, Merseyside, Vienna, Eisenstadt, Tromso, Oslo, Helsinki 
 
Table 6 : Optimal Strategies (with default parameter values): BOF, COF and ROF
 O 
(1+O)  is 
shadow 
price on 
PVF in 
EEFP 
D 
weight on 
current/future 
generations in 
BOF 
J   
weight on 
external costs 
in EEFP 
E  
proportion of 
user benefits 
captured in VC 
Edinburgh    - 
Merseyside     
Vienna    - 
Eisenstadt -   - 
Oslo   - - 
Tromsø - - -  
Helsinki - - -  
Salerno   - - 
Table 7 : sensitivity tests conducted in city case studies 
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Measures 
Cities 
Value of O Infrastructure 
investment - High, 
Medium or None 
Increasing/ 
Decreasing 
Road 
capacity 
PT frequency 
† 
PT fares † Road 
Pricing † 
Parking 
Charges @
Class of 
city 
Edinburgh 0.25 Medium 10% 85%(70%) -90%(-35%) 1.6(1.6) ~(300%) 3 
Edinburgh 0 Medium 10% 85%(70%) -90%(-35%) 1.6(1.6) ~(300%) 3 
         
Merseyside 1.5 Medium 10% 20%(-40%) -70%(-40%) 1(1) 0(200%) 3 
Merseyside 1.0 Medium 10% 20%(-40%) -70%(-40%) 1(1) 0(200%) 3 
Merseyside 0.5 Medium 10% 34%(-50%) -100%(-100%) 0(0) -100%(300%) 1 
Merseyside 0.25 Medium 10% 50%(-40%) -100%(-100%) 0(0) -100%(100%) 1 
         
Vienna 0.25 None -10% 0% 77% 0 0%(245%) 4 
Vienna 0.2 None -10% 0% 50% 0 0%(245%) 4 
Vienna 0.1 None -9% 3% 4% 0 0%(225%) 4 
Vienna 0 None -7% 3% -15% 0 -13%(150%) 3 
         
Oslo 0.25 Medium 10% -15%(0%) -5%(-15%) 5(5) 0% 4 
Oslo 0 Medium 10% -10%(0%) -5%(-15%) 5(5) 0% 4 
         
Salerno 0.25 None 0% 80% 25% 0 300% 3 
Salerno 0 None 10% 50% -50% 1 -50% 2 
~  indicates irrelevant around the optimum 
† off peak values are shown in ( ) for Edinburgh, Merseyside, Oslo 
@
 long stay; short stay values are shown in ( ) for Edinburgh, Merseyside, Vienna, Oslo 
Table 8 : Optimal BOF Strategies when the value of O is varied 
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Measures 
Cities 
Value of 
D 
Infrastructure 
investment - High, 
Medium or None 
Increasing/ 
Decreasing 
Road capacity 
PT frequency † PT fares † Road Pricing 
† 
Parking 
Charges @
City Class 
Edinburgh 0 High 10% 53%(100%) -100%(0%) 3.3(3.2) ~(300%) 3 
Edinburgh 0.015 High 10% 53%(100%) -100%(0%) 3.3(3.2) ~(300%) 3 
Edinburgh 0.1 Medium 10% 85%(70%) -90%(-35%) 1.6(1.6) ~(300%) 3 
Edinburgh 1.0 Medium 10% 85%(70%) -90%(-35%) 1.6(1.6) ~(300%) 3 
         
Merseyside 0 Medium 10% 50%(-40%) -100%(-100%) 0 0%(200%) 1/3 
Merseyside 0.1 Medium 10% 50%(-40%) -100%(-100%) 0 -100%(100%) 1 
Merseyside 1.0 Medium 10% 50%(-40%) -100%(-100%) 0 -100%(100%) 1 
         
Vienna 0 High -11% 12% 80% 0 0%(200%) 3 
Vienna 0.1 None -10% 0% 77% 0 0%(245%) 4 
Vienna 0.25 None -12% 0% 77% 0 0%(245%) 4 
         
Eisenstadt 0 - -15% -50% -50% 0 -50%(115%) 3 
Eisenstadt 0.1 - -15% -50% -50% 0 -50%(115%) 3 
Eisenstadt 0.25 - -15% -50% -50% 0 -50%(115%) 3 
         
Oslo 0 Medium 10% 0%(-10%) -10%(-30%) 5(5) 0% 4 
Oslo 0.1 Medium 10% -15%(0%) -5%(-15%) 5(5) 0% 4 
Oslo 0.25 Medium 10% -15%(0%) -5%(-15%) 5(5) 0% 4 
Oslo 1.0 Medium 10% -15%(-15%) 20%(20%) 5(5) 0% 4 
         
Salerno 0 No 0 80% 25% 0 300% 3 
Salerno 0.1 No 0 80% 25% 0 300% 3 
Salerno 0.25 No 0 80% 25% 0 300% 3 
- not included,   ~  indicates irrelevant around the optimum,   † off peak values are shown in ( ) for Edinburgh, Oslo 
@
 long stay; short stay values are shown in ( ) for Edinburgh, Vienna, Eisenstadt, Oslo 
Table 9: Optimal BOF Strategies when the value of D is varied 
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Measures 
 
 
Cities 
Multiply 
original J 
by: 
Infrastructure 
investment - 
High, Medium 
or None 
 
Increasing/ 
Decreasing 
Road capacity 
 
PT frequency † PT fares † Road Pricing 
† 
Parking Charges 
@
Class of 
city 
Edinburgh 1 Medium 10% 85%(70%) -90%(-35%) 1.6(1.6) ~(300%) 3 
Edinburgh 2 Medium 10% 85%(70%) -90%(-35%) 3.5(3.2) ~(300%) 3 
         
Merseyside 0 Medium 10% 50%(-40%) -100%(-100%) 0(0) -100%(100%) 1 
Merseyside 1 Medium 10% 50%(-40%) -100%(-100%) 0(0) -100%(100%) 1 
Merseyside 2 Medium 10% 50%(-40%) -100%(-100%) 0(0) -100%(100%) 1 
Merseyside 10 Medium 5% 25%(-40%) -100%(-100%) 3.5(3.5) 0%(200%) 3 
         
Vienna 0 None -8% 0% 77% 0 0%(245%) 4 
Vienna 1 None -10% 0% 77% 0 0%(245%) 4 
         
Eisenstadt 0 - -15% -50% -50% 0 -50%(115%) 3 
Eisenstadt 1 - -15% -50% -50% 0 -50%(115%) 3 
- not included 
~  indicates irrelevant around the optimum 
† off peak values are shown in ( ) for Edinburgh, Merseyside 
@
 long stay; short stay values are shown in ( ) for Edinburgh, Merseyside, Vienna, Eisenstadt 
 
Table 10 : Optimal BOF Strategies resulting from changing the value of J 
  
  Merseyside Tromsø Helsinki 
User benefits for optimal BOF strategies 
(UB) (million euros) 
5740 280 2330 
PVF for optimal BOF strategy (million euros) -2120 -84 -1779 
0.37 0.30 0.76 Required value of E to implement optimal 
BOF strategy under a constrained public 
finance regime 
 
Table 11:  Value capture and PVF for BOF optimal strategies 
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